Followed by a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, which approved the collection of a defendant's DNA upon arrests under the Fourth Amendment, the Minister of Justice, Peter MacKay indicated in an interview with the Globe and Mail that he and his Ministry are considering a similar model for Canada. This paper examines the possibility of a similar legislative framework in Canada and argues that although collection of DNA upon arrests was found justified under the Fourth Amendment, it does not necessarily mean that it will be found justified under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While s.8 of the Charter seems to give similar protection as the Fourth Amendment, they have very different requirements for judicial authorization, reasonableness and standard of probable cause.
This paper examines the possibility of a similar legislative framework in Canada and argues that although collection of DNA upon arrests was found justified under the Fourth Amendment, it does not necessarily mean that it will be found justified under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While s.8 of the Charter seems to give similar protection as the Fourth Amendment, they have very different requirements for judicial authorization, reasonableness and standard of "probable cause".
Scrutinizing those different requirements and standards, this paper holds that the process of DNA collection is highly intrusive and would be a serious violation of s.8 of the Charter as it could reveal an excessive amount of private information about an individual over which he/she has a strong reasonable expectation of privacy. Furthermore, it will deprive people from their right to be presumed innocent, which is protected under s.11 (d) and significantly impact socially marginalized groups.
Finally, this paper conducts an analysis of the violations under s.1 of the Charter and indicates that none of the violations can be justified in a free and democratic society. although s.8 of the Charter seems to give similar protection as the Fourth Amendment, they have very different requirements for judicial authorization, reasonableness and standard of probable cause. 5 This paper scrutinizes those different requirements and standards 6 and holds the view that the process of DNA collection is highly intrusive as it could reveal an excessive amount of private information about an individual over which he/she has a strong reasonable expectation of privacy. In essence, DNA collection from arrestees will be a serious violation of s.8 of the
Charter. Furthermore, it will deprive people from their right to be presumed innocent, which is protected under s.11 (d).
In doing so, this essay is divided into three parts. Part I gives an overview of the various requirements of s.8 of the Charter and analyzes whether collecting DNA from arrestees could meet those requirements. Part II describes the idea of the presumption of innocence and demonstrates how individuals will be deprived of this right if their DNA is collected upon arrests. Finally, part III examines whether any of those violation could be justified in a free and democratic society under s.1 of the Charter.
PART I -VIOLATION OF S.8:
In R. v. Rao, a reference was made to the Ontario Court of Appeal to determine whether a provision of the Narcotic Control Act is "reasonable" within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter.
As a response, the court indicates that there are two grounds based on which a challenge to the 5 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf (Toronto: Carswell, 2006 ) at 48-3. 6 An important point should be noted that this paper does not go onto comparing the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and s.8 because this is beyond its scope. Therefore, it will only focus on the requirements of s. 8 and 11 (d) . Also, it is virtually impossible to assess the actual implication and the gravity of the infringements in absence of a specific wording of the Criminal Code. Thus, this paper is written primarily based on different probabilities and certain assumptions will be made accordingly.
reasonableness of a particular search may be made under s.8 of the Charter -firstly, the constitutionality of the legislation that authorizes the search; secondly, the reasonableness of the search itself that was carried out under a constitutionally valid statute. 7 This essay will examine both -the constitutionality of a potential legislation that would authorize DNA collection and the reasonableness of a search that would involve DNA collection. However, before going to this examination, it is important to determine whether collection of DNA could be considered as a search under the meaning of s.8 and whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists with respect to collecting DNA from arrestees.
What is a search or a seizure under s.8?
A search, under s.8, is defined as "an examination. 
What is a reasonable expectation of privacy and does it involve in DNA Collection?
There is no exhaustive definition of privacy. Binnie J. describes it as a "protean concept" 11 because it evolves over time. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that an individual possess three distinct privacy interests -personal privacy, territorial privacy and informational privacy. Personal privacy involves the bodily integrity of a person; the right not to have our bodies touched or explored to disclose objects or matters we wish to conceal.
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Territorial privacy goes "beyond our bodies and the places where we live and work". pattern, and the information that DNA can provide is so profound and accurate that it led many commentators to equate DNA typing with fingerprinting.
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While DNA information could be extremely helpful for the criminal justice system, it could also reveal excessive amount of private information about an individual over which the person has a strong reasonable expectation of privacy. As the Supreme Court of Canada said in R v. Plant, an individual enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his or her core biographical personal information held by others if the information seized is of a "personal and confidential" nature. Section 8 of the Charter "should seek to protect a biographical core of personal information which individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the state. This would include information which tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual".
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Moreover, the fact that DNA is a part of an individual's bodily substance, a person has the highest claim of ownership and control over it. This control and ownership reinforces a strong reasonable expectation of privacy as mentioned in R v. Belnavis. 28 However, the court also clarified that the idea of the right to privacy is not necessarily tied to property, but rather the basic requirement of individual freedom obliges the state to respect the dignity, autonomy and integrity of the individual. 29 The degree of privacy, which the law protects, is closely linked to the effect that a breach of that privacy would have on the freedom and dignity of the individual.
Therefore, a person is entitled to an extremely high expectation of privacy in relation to his or Tessling was violated by an FLIR image taken by RCMP without prior judicial authorization. In answering the question and determining the respondent's reasonable expectation of privacy, the court used the "Totality of the Circumstances" test. 39 The Tessling test follows:
1.
What was the subject matter of the DNA information? 2.
Did the respondent have a direct interest in the subject matter of the DNA information? 3.
Did the respondent have a subjective expectation of privacy in the subject matter of the DNA information? 4. If so, was the expectation objectively reasonable? In this respect, regard must be had to:
a. the place where the alleged "search" occurred; b. whether the subject matter was in public view; c. whether the subject matter had been abandoned; d. whether the information was already in the hands of third parties; if so, was it subject to an obligation of confidentiality? e. whether the police technique was intrusive in relation to the privacy interest; f. whether the use of DNA analysis technology was itself objectively unreasonable; g. whether the DNA profile exposed any intimate details of the respondent's lifestyle, or information of a biographical nature.
Since, first three of the four prongs of the Tessling test and the factor (g) of the 4 th prong (objective reasonableness) were discussed earlier in determining the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, instead of being repetitive, this analysis will only focus on the other 39 Point to be noted that to make this test more relevant to the discussion of this paper, the word "FLIR" is replaced with "DNA" and "surveillance" was replaced with "DNA analysis technology".
factors of the objective reasonableness test of a search and seizure that involves collection of DNA.
The place where a search occurs plays an extremely important role in respect to its reasonableness. In R. v. Stillman, 40 an accused under custody, informed the police through his lawyers that he would not consent to the taking of any samples of his bodily fluids. The police were aware of his decision but nevertheless took possession of the tissue discarded by the accused while he was in custody. The Supreme Court of Canada states that although the accused's expectation of privacy in this instance was lower, after his arrest, it was not so low as to permit the seizure of the tissue that contains his bodily substance. The privacy expectation
should not be reduced to such an extent as to justify seizures of bodily samples without consent, particularly for those who are detained while they are still presumed to be innocent. 41 However, this may be different if the accused voluntarily abandons any bodily fluids because in the same case, the court held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy on the mucus that he had thrown away using a tissue paper.
Applying these factors to the idea of DNA collection upon arrests, it could be concluded that such an attempt fails to comply with the aforementioned factors and is considered unreasonable unless an arrestee voluntarily provides his or her DNA samples. It should be noted that while in Stillman the court finds it reasonable to collect the abandoned samples of an arrestee, it might not be the case now because of the factor 4( collection of abandoned bodily samples because they can be considered as confidential information held by a third party. Therefore, the only way DNA samples could be collected without a warrant is through voluntarily submission by the accused.
The remaining factors and probably the most serious factors of this test are 4(e) and 4(f).
Under the current Canadian Criminal Code, a DNA warrant can authorize one of the three investigative procedures for the collection of biological evidence from a suspect - (1) The taking of the dental impressions, hair samples and buccal swabs from the accused also contravened the appellant's s. 7 Charter right to security of the person. The taking of the bodily samples was highly intrusive. It violated the sanctity of the body which is essential to the maintenance of human dignity. It was the ultimate invasion of the appellant's privacy. 48 Furthermore, in Stillman, the court also equates unauthorized use of a person's body or bodily substances with compelled "testimony" that could render a trial unfair. Based on this reasoning, the court held that the security of the body is as worthy of protection from state intrusion aimed at compelled self-incrimination as are statements. 49 Therefore, it becomes clear that both police techniques of DNA collection and its analysis both are highly intrusive and unreasonable.
PART II: VIOLATION OF S. 11 (D)
The criminal justice system attempts to provide a normative basis for drawing an appropriate line between the state and individual interests through adopting certain legal doctrines such as the reasonable expectation of privacy, arbitrary detention, and principles of fundamental justice. However, one of the most celebrated legal doctrines in maintaining this balance is the presumption of innocence. 50 This conception is constitutionally protected by the virtue of s. 11(d) of the Charter as it gives everyone the right "to be presumed innocent until 47 R v Pohoretsky [1987] proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal."
The Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized in many decisions that the presumption of innocence has an omnipresent status in the criminal justice system and protects citizens at the pre-charge stage, 51 which embraces a normative commitment to the view that all citizens are entitled to be presumed legally and factually innocent of a crime until they are legally and factually proven to be guilty. 52 In a historic decision, R v. Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada describes the presumption of innocence as something that "protects the fundamental liberty and human dignity of any and every person accused by the State of criminal conduct," and further states that the presumption of innocence is essential in a society committed to fairness and social justice.
53
The idea "beyond reasonable doubt", which is derived from this notion of the presumption of innocence, puts the burden on the Crown to prove the guilt of an accused by a high degree or quantum of proof that proves the guilt beyond any doubt that a reasonable person can possibly have. 54 In R. v. Lifchus, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a judge must undertake the difficult task of explaining the meaning of reasonable doubt to a jury and instruct them to maintain the presumption of innocence throughout the entire process. Kent Roach, Criminal Law, 5 th ed, (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 50. 55 The court stated that the idea of reasonable doubt is not an imaginary or frivolous concept, thus, it must not be based upon sympathy or prejudice. Rather, it must be based upon reasoning and commonsense. While the court acknowledged that it will be impossible to prove guilt with 100% certainty, higher probability or likelihood that an accused has committed the crime is not sufficient for the conviction. The jury must feel that they are sure based on the evidence presented and commonsense that the accused has committed the crime and this is what beyond reasonable doubt means. See Rbe Lifchus, [1997] 3 SCR 320.
It should not be forgotten that the importance of pre-charge and post-charge assumption of innocence are not the same since the aforementioned discussion shows only the significance of post-charge assumption of innocence. However, logically, maintaining the presumption of innocence at pre-charge level is more important because it embodies the normative commitment contained within the criminal justice system to presume that random bystanders are factually innocent; otherwise it will be impossible to live in a society and there will be no faith in humankind.
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Requiring an arrestee who is not even charged to provide his bodily samples to put in a permanent DNA database does not conform to this doctrine of presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental value of the Canadian criminal justice system. In R. v. Rodgers, the court found it reasonable to collect DNA samples from the "convicted offenders" because these people were proven to be a threat to society beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, there was a strong public interest in their identification. However, collecting DNA from arrestees who are neither charged nor proven guilty of a crime or considered a threat to the society crosses any boundary of reasonableness. They could be any random innocent bystanders who happen to be at the wrong place at a wrong time. However, requiring them to provide their bodily samples which contain their most unique and personal information at this stage is another way of making them responsible (at least to some extent) for the crime committed, and makes it seem like they have innocence because it permits a conviction in spite of a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as to the guilt of the accused. 57 Consequently, a statute that would permit such infringement will be constitutionally invalid by the virtue of s. 11 (d) of the Charter. The only way such violation could be saved "if the existence of the substituted fact leads inexorably to the conclusion that the essential element exists, with no other reasonable possibilities, will the statutory presumption be constitutionally valid." 58 However, the mere idea of collecting DNA from arrestees does not fall within this scope of exception and cannot be reasonable.
PART III: JUSTIFICATION UNDER S.1:
While the Charter guarantees certain rights and freedoms, it also makes it clear that they are not absolute and subject to reasonable limits set out in s. 1. 59 Therefore, every claim of Charter rights violation is two folded -(a) whether or not an impugned legislation or government action limits an individual's rights or freedoms set out in the Charter; and (b) if it does, can the limitation be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
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Throughout the previous sections, it was established that collecting DNA from arrestees infringes an individualns Charter protected rights and freedoms. Therefore, this section will look at the possibility of whether or not such an infringement could be justified. An important point, to be noted however, is that without having an actual wording and legislative framework, it will be virtually impossible to assess the actual implication and severity of a law that permits an 57 R v Whyte, [1988] Applying Oakes Test, there is no doubt that collecting DNA from the arrestees has an objective, which is to identify the suspects with better accuracy, something that is important to the criminal justice system. However, this is a very narrow and specified objective and perhaps too narrow to limit some of people's most important rights. This objective will not be rationally connected to the law because there are many other less intrusive ways such as fingerprint and photograph that can be used to identify individuals. As mentioned earlier, DNA can reveal a significant amount of personal information about an individual such as personal genetic make up and core biological information. Collecting this information would not be considered rationally connected to the objective of the law and thus, would infringe more rights than necessary. As a result the collection of DNA would fail to meet first three prongs of the test.
Moreover, as it is apparent from the previous discussion that collecting DNA is a highly intrusive process that involves bodily integrity and infringes some of the most fundamental rights, the violation cannot be minimal on a balance of probability. In justifying the DNA collection from arrestee in Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court of the United States holds that "the arrestee is already in valid police custody for a serious offense supported by probable cause.
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" The court went as far as saying that the arrestee has a reduced privacy interest because he or she has "been suspected of a wrong". 66 However, if merely for the purpose of identification, it becomes necessary to collect DNA samples from people who are presumed to be innocent and not yet proven to be a threat for the society, then logically, it will also be justified to collect DNA evidence in every situation, which requires a person to identify him or herself (i.e. stopping a vehicle for speeding, accessing government facilities, entering to court rooms etc.). A free and democratic society cannot afford to extend the scope of privacy infringement to such an extent, especially by a government, which always has a serious interest in limiting individualsto extend the scope of Finally, a legislation permitting collection of DNA from arrestees would disproportionally impact not only the person to whom it applies but also the society as a whole.
First of all, collecting DNA from an individual and entering it in a national DNA database may create a psychological prison for the person. A person would not know how much information about him or her is in the hand of government and how the information will be handled. He or she would constantly worry about the potential misuse of the information as the database is humanly operated and the information is vulnerable to abuse, misinterpretation and distortion.
Also, the fact that the conviction rate of violent crimes in Canada is very low (52%), it means that almost half of the people whose rights and liberties will be taken away and be psychologically imprisoned are actually not criminals.
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Allowing warrantless DNA collection of arrestees will disproportionately impact the members of visible minority 68 and socially disadvantaged groups such as Aboriginal and Black communities. They will be unduly impacted because it is an open secret that the "Black community is subject to much greater police surveillance", and "much more likely to be caught when they break the law compared to White people who engage in the same forms of criminal activity". 69 While it is very difficult to find actual statistic of racial arrests in Canada, as there is no requirement to record an arresteecret that the "Black community is subject to much greater police surveillance", and "much more likely to be caught when they black drug dealers (selfidentified) report that they have been arrested at some time in their lives, compared to only 35% of the White drug dealers (self-identified)". 70 Therefore, a significant numbers of people in the government DNA database would be the members of visible minority groups. Consequently, they will be more vulnerable to many different forms of discrimination, police suspicions and socio-legal marginalization.
CONCLUSION:
In conclusion, it is clear that although DNA collection might be a useful identification tool for law enforcement, it can reveal some of the most unique and biographical core of personal information about an individual that should not be under the possession of the government without prior judicial authorization based on probable cause. A search of arrestees that includes DNA collection without their consent or a valid warrant will always infringe on their right to reasonable expectation of privacy and deprive them from their right to be presumed innocent before proven legally and factually guilty. A statue that authorizes such a search will not meet the requirements and standards of reasonableness established by the Canadian courts and cannot be justified in a free and democratic society.
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